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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





THOMAS M. KINGDON and 
JOAN 0. KINDGON, Case No. 18290 
Defendants/ 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to have earnest 
Money and other monies paid persuant to a Sale Agreement of 
residential real estate. There was also a Counterclaim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The honorable Jay E. Banks tried this case without 
a Jury on March 5, 1981, and found that the earnest Money 
agreement had been entered into but it had been rescinded or 
modified by the parties in many respects. 
$1,000.00 was paid as earnest money and $9,800.00 
was paid as additional down payment on a conditional payment 
check. Judge Banks found thatthe earnest money and additional 
down payment were to· be refunded to f .. Buyers, but th~the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Buyers (Plaintiffs) had wrongfully filed a mechanics lien 
and that Defendants were entitled to $1,000.00 in punitive 
damages. The $1,000.00 Judgment was offset against the 
$10,800.00 Plaintiffs Judgment resulting in a net Judgment 
for the Plaintiffs of $9,800.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs/Respondents seek that the Supreme 
Court uphold the judgement of the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs/buyers entered into an agreement with 
the Defendants to purchase a home owned by the Defendants on 
or about February 12, 1978. This agreement was written and 
admitted as exhibit Pl5 into the Trial. 
The document was signed by both Plaintiffs and both 
Defendants. 
At the time when the additional $10,000.00 was due 
the parties started negotiating be~ause the Defendants wanted 
to keep a light fixture, which was agreed, and the $200.00 
deduction was made from the $10,000.00 due and so the buyers 
only paid the sellers an additional $9,800.00. The buyers 
requested that the sellers repair the patio, but the sellers 
refused. The buyers requested that the sellers paint the front 
of the home, the court found that the sellers agreed to do 
this. The sellers later requested that the date of possession 
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be extended until their new home was finished. The 
buyers agreed to that extension. The buyers later 
requested that the sellers pay rent for the extension, 
but the sellers refused to pay rent unless the buyers 
would close the transaction and the sellers could get 
paid. 
The sellers failed to paint the front of their 
home and when the day for closing came the buyers refused 
to pay tne full amount of earnest money but insisted on 
a $500.00 deduction because of the failure to paint. 
Because of this claim the matter never closed, and 
Mrs. Allen left the closing discussion without saying 
anything. Mrs. Kingdon left and said the Kingdons would 
not ref~nd the earnest money. The court found that after 
the wives had left Mr. Kingdon said that he would refund 
the earnest money to the buyers. 
Later the sellers had their attorney send a letter 
to the Plaintiff demanding the closing of the transaction 
which was refused. The sellers later moved out of their 
home into their new home and never rented the home. The 
court found that they failed to mitigate their damages 
by trying to ren~ it, and that whatever the value of the 
home the court found that the sellers still had the home. 
-5-
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE GREATER WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY PROVIDES 
THAT A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITHIN THE STATUTE 
OF F~.llDS MAY BE RESCINDED ORALLY. 
Although there are a minority of cases to the con-
trary, the law regarding oral rescission is well stated 
as follows: 
It has been held in some of the earlier 
cases that an agreement to rescind is as 
much an agreement concerning land as the 
original contract, and hence should be in 
- writing; but all the later cases, both in 
England and the United States, are unani-
mous in holding that a contract in writing 
and by law required to be in writing, may 
in equity be rescinded by parol, and this, 
eventhough the contract may have been 
under seal. Such rescission may be effected 
not only be express agreement, but by any 
course of conduct clearly indicating a 
mutual assent to the termination or aband-
onment of the contract. 2 Warville on 
Vendors § 826 (2d ed.). 
This statement was cited as definitive of the law 
in Utah under Cutright v. Union Savings & Investment Co., 
33 Utah 486, 94 P. 984 (1908) In that case, one Jenkins 
purchased, persuant to a real estate contract, real 
property from the Defendant. Jenkins fell behind in 
payment and, when the defendant tried to collect, 
r~turned the key to the property and indicated his un-
willingness to bring payments current and r~main in 
posession. Jenkins assignee sued, claiming that the 
rescission was invalid, arguing that any modification or 
rescission of a contract under the Statute of Frauds must 
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also be in writing and not merely oral. The trial court 
ruled against the Plaintiff, and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
In the present case, the lower court has held thatan 
oral .rescission. of an earnest money agreement for the 
purchase of land is valid. This decision is supported 
by Utah case law and in addition represents the greater 
weight of authority in all jurisdictions. 4 S. WILLISTON, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 592 (~ ed. 1961) 
and 28 Rocky Mtn L. Rev. 269 (1956) 
There is no Utah case law exactly on point. However, 
other jurisdictions provide excellent support for the 
decision of the lower court. A case precisely on point 
was decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado based on a 
Statute of Fraud essenti.ally identical to the control-
ling Utah Statute. 
The Colorado statute read: 
No estate or interest in lands, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning lands, or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall hereafter be created, gran-
ted, assigned, surrendered or declared, 
unless by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by 
writing. C.S.A. chapter 71 §6 (1935). 
The Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953) varies little in 
wording and is identical in meaning~ 
-7-
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No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other 
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized by writing. Utah Code Ann §25-5-1 (1953). 
Niernburg v. Feld,131 Colo 508, 283 P.2d 640 (1955) 
is fact specific to the case at bar. Defendants/Sellers 
(Husband and Wife) entered into a sales agreement with 
the Plaintiffs/Buyers (Husband and Wife) for the sale 
of certain real estate owned jointly by Defendants. The 
Buyers paid a deposit agreeing to pay the balance upon 
closing. The contract included a liquidated damages 
clause requiring the forfeiture of deposit on failµre 
to pay the balance. Prior to closing the buyers advised 
the sellers they "couldn't go through with the deal." At 
a conference with only the husbands present, just prior 
to, closing, there was an oral agreement to mutually 
rescind the contract. At that time the seller made an 
oral promise to refund buyers deposit upon certain terms 
which were shortly fulfilled. Subsequently seller re-
fused to refund as promised and buyer brought an action 
to recover his deposit. From a lower court judgment 
in favor of the buyer, seller appealed alleg~ng error 
in three areas similar to those.presented by the seller 
in the present case. They were: 
1. An attempted executory rescission 
or modification of a prior written 
agreement is invalid as being in vio .. 
lation of the Statute of Frauds. 
- 8-
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2. That a subsequent oral promise was 
without consideration and therefore 
void, because no benefit was con-
ferred or detriment suffered. 
3. ·The oral promise of defendant 
Phillip Niernberg given to Plaintiffs 
did not constitute a rescission of 
the written agreement, because one of 
the parties to the written agreement 
was not a party to the subsequent 
oral agree~ent and one joint obliger 
could not agree to a rescission with-
out the consent of the other obliger. 
Niernberg, 283 P.2d at 640. 
In opposing all three allegations and affirming the 
decision of the lower court the Colorado Supreme Court 
held respectively: First, 
It seems to be the better - reasoned rule 
that an executory contract involving 
title to, or an interest in, lands may be 
rescinded by agreement resting in parol. 
The Statute of Frauds concerns the making 
of contract only, and does not apply to 
the matter of their revocation. The 
requirement for the making of a contract 
is one thing and the revocation or rescis-
sion thereof is another, and we are sat-
isfied to announce as the law in this 
jurisdiction that such executory contracts 
may be rescinded by the mutual consent of 
parties thereto. Id at 642. 
Second, regarding the promise to repay the deposit by 
the seller: 
As to the question of lack 9f considera-
tion, we find that in the instant case 
there was a promise for a promise involving 
the release of each party from further per-
formance, and this mutual consideration is 
sufficient to support the agreement. Id 
at 642. 
Third, regarding the absense of the sellers wife: 
Neither is he in position to successfully 
contend as a reason for escape, that he is 
-9-
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not liable because his wife was not a party 
to the rescission. If he assumed to act 
in her absence and she is dismissed from 
the case, he should be bound by his own 
actions and declaration. Id at 642. 
The decision of the lower court in the case at bar 
complies almost exactly with the_ Niernberg decision 
and represents the weight of authority. 
The honorable Judge Banks, after hearing all the 
evidence, determined that the earnest money agreement 
was rescinded at closing (R-134). In addition each 
husband was the effective and the apparent agent of 
their respective wives to rescind the contract. (R-133), 
These findings were correctly made and represent the 
law in this jurisdiction. A respected treatise on the 
law of contracts properly states "The Statute of Frauds 
does not mention contracts for rescission or discharge 
and such contracts are, therefore, not affected by its 
terms." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 592 (3d ed. 1961). 
POINT 2 
A FORFEITURE OF BUYERS DEPOSIT WOULD BE PUNITIVE IN 
NATURE AND WAS PROPERLY REFUSED ENFORCEMENT BY THE 
LOWER COURT. 
The seller promised, at the time of rescission to 
refund buyers deposit. The lower court cited the 
f o 11 m.;i n g in i ts f i I l di 11 g of fact : " After Mrs . A 11 en 
ar:d r~rs. Kinadon left, ~1r. Kingdon agreed to refund the 
e~r:.cst r.or;c-y to the Pldinliffs." (R-133) 
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The record correctly states that " The bank officer; 
the only disinterested witness who testified, stated that 
Mr. Kingdon said that the deal was off and that Mr. Allen 
could have his money back. Also, that the money was in 
the bank, and that he would pay it the next day." (R-108) 
Based on this testimony and the evidence as a 
whole the lower court determined that such a promise 
had been made by the Seller. The defendant/seller, has 
failed to present the required preponderance of evidence 
to the contrary. The standard of review on appeal has 
long been established in this state. "On review, the 
Supreme Court will accord considerable deference to 
judgement of trial court due to its advantaged positi9n 
and will not disturb action of that court unless evidence 
clearly preponderates to the cor1trary, or the trial cour~ 
abuses its discretion or rnissapplies principles of law. 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177 (1981). Neither 
abuse of discretion nor a missapplication of principles 
of law have been demonstrated by a clear preponderance 
of evidence to warrant the imposition of a harsh for-
feiture on buyer. 
A. The Law in This Jurisdiction Disfavors 
The Enforcement of Forfeitures. 
The lower court found that the loss to both Buyer 
and Seller approximately balanced such that "The 
liquidated damages provision of the contract is too 
-11-
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harsh and should not be enforced by the court." 
The language of forfeiture referred to ~tates: 
(R-134) 
"In the event the purchaser fails to pay the 
balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase 
price or complete said purchase as herein provided, the 
amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller 
be re~ained as liquidated and agreed damages." 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 15-P lines 39-40. 
It should be clear that the provision above cited 
represents an attempt to enact an inequitable forfeiture. 
It simply provides that if the purchaser causes the sale 
to fail, seller is entitled to keep all monies paid, 
with no allowances for amount. In this case, the seller 
attempted to use the clause to enact a $10·, 8 00. 00 penalty. 
The lower courts refusal to enforce such a provision is 
in line with the law in this jurisdiction which disfavors 
forfeitures. In Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 
589 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976) the court states that forfeitures 
are not enforced in the law, and forfeiture provisions 
will be strictly construed against the one who seeks to 
enforce them. In stronger language, the Morgan v. 
Sorense~ 3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229 (1955) court states 
that forfeitures are odious to the law. Such provision 
must not be enforced in the case at bar. 
B. As a Matter of Law, Buyer is Entitled 
to a Refund of Earnest Monies in Accord 
with the Judgement of the Lower Court. 
Finally, even if "mutual promise'' and 
"unjust forfeiture" were not sufficient to allow buyer a 
-· 12-
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refund, he is entitled to a refund as a matter of law. 
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 (1953) provides that more than 
one writing may be used to satisfy the requirements of 
the statute of frauds provided some nexus between 
writings is shown. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 
(1980). Buyer wrote a check for $9800.00 with an 
insc~iption referring to the earnest money agreement. 
The inscription provided for the signed acceptance of 
Seller in the following words: 
Earnest money paid 
Additional Earnest •. 
Total Earnest Monies 
(P EX 14-P) 
..•• 1,000.00 
. .10,000.00 
paid subject to closing less 
credit lighting fixture ....•• 11,000.00 
Lot 10 Cottonwood Hills Sub 3. . . 200.00 
$9,800.00 
Utah case law provides that the requirements of 
the statute of frauds may be satisfied by more than one 
writing where~ 
Either by express reference in signed writing 
to unsigned one or by implied reference 
gleaned from contents of the writing and the 
circumstance surrounding the transaction, in 
which case parol evidence may be used to 
connect unsigned document to one that has been 
signed by person to be charged. Gregerson, 617 
P.2d at 370 (1980). 
The court in Gregerson held that where a check was 
inscribed by a purchaser in the manner stated above and 
where the inscription expressly referred to the parties 
with Sellers knowledge of the subject matter, that the 
two writings must be read together. Id. at 370. 
-13-
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The check in the present case complies with 
the requirements set by the Utah Court in Gregerson 
and therefore must be read together with the Earnest 
Money Agreement. The inscription provides for the 
return of Buyers money by Seller on failure to close. 
POINT 3 
THE LOWER COURT, BY ITS DECISION, FOLLOWS THE 
EQUITABLE TREND TOWARDS WIDER ENFORCEMENT OF 
ORAL PROMISES. 
In the case at bar it is undisputed by either 
party that the written contract, the Earnest Money Agree-
ment, was subsequently modified by oral agreement a 
number of times. This occurred despite provisions in 
the agreement forbidding such modifications exept in 
writing. The conclusion that must be drawn is that 
oral modification was an accepted means of contract 
development and that a demand for strict performance 
under the writing does not comport with the course of 
dealing evidenced by the parties. 
Although there are cases to the contrary, th~ 
greater number of cases follow the trend that a written 
executory contract for the sale of land may be reasoning 
behind this trand is informatively stated in the following 
statement: 
There is a trend "towards wider enforcement of 
oral promises." This trend was reflected as 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
early as 1885 when Mr. ,Justice Stephe~ said 
that the Statute of Frauds "is a relic of 
times when the best evidence on such subjects 
was encluded on a principle now exploded." The 
Thousands of cases that have applied interpre-
ted the Statute of Frauds show how obscure and 
inadequate the statute has become. In June of 
1954 the Law Reform Act in England just about 
completed the burial of the statute in that 
country. The Law Revision Conunittee stated 
that the statute has to a great extent been 
modified by the decisions of the courts in 
trying to save contracts, and that it is pos-
sible that it produced more fraud and perjuries 
than it repressed. 28 Rocky Mountan L.Review 
271,270 (1956). 
It is clear in this case that oral rncdifications 
were very consistent with the intentions of the party. 
A substantial injustice would result if Plaintiff 
were estopped from exercising his rights arising 
from these oral agreements when there is clear 
evidence that such a contract was made. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court found that the operative contract, 
the Earnest Money Agreemen~was entered into by the 
parties. That various oral changes were made by the 
parties. That defendants failed.to perform one of 
those changes and consequently, at closing, Plaintiff 
refused to pay the full purchase price. Both parties 
then, by oral agreement rescinded the agreement at 
closing. In addition, the court found that the seller 
promised to refund the entire earnest money; a retention 
of which, as liquidated dan;ages, would be too harsh 
and should not be eriforccd by the court. 
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The weight of authority in case law and simple 
justice require that the finding, conclusion and decision 
of the lower court be affirmed. Respondent/Buyer therefore, 
respectfully requests that the decision of the lower 
court be affirmed with costs and attorneys fees for this 
appeal. 
DATED this JQ __ day of June, 1984. 
Boyd M. Fullmer Assee. 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of this Brief of Respondents to Snow, Christensen, 
and Martineau, attorneys for Appellants Defendants 
10 Exchange Place 11th ~loor: Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
This -1.{__aay of June, 1984. 
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